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W ST flEGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
regulations should not invalidate such a regulation, for, as already
observed, interstate commerce, being a practical conception, should
be dealt with in a practical way. Hence, the West Virginia case
and the New York case, in holding constitutional such state regu-
lation of the rate of sale, are clearly correct in conclusion. 0
But, since such a regulation of the so-called "rate of sale" in-
cludes, in practical effect, a regulation of the rate of transportation,
it would seem to follow that there is, in this respect, no practical
distinction between two sorts of state regulations. Therefore,
since a state can regulate such "rate of sale", a fortiori it would
seem that a state can regulate such rate of transportation, for cer-
tainly under the implied prohibitions of the commerce clause a
state cannot do by indirection what it cannot do directly."
-T. P. H.
COUNTY IN WHICH PROCESS MAY BE SERVED UPON AN OFFICER OR
AGENT OF A CORPORATION.-Until some few years ago, it had been
the uniform practice in West Virginia to serve process upon an
officer or agent of a corporation in the county in which he resided.
Prior to acts of 1903, it was understood to be erroneous in all in-
stances if the return did not show that the officer or agent was
served in the county in which he resided.- This requirement grew
out of a rather curious chain of statutory construction whereby
chapter 50 of the Code is made to control the service of process in
the circuit courts.
It wlll be noted that section 7 of chapter 124 of the Code desig-
nates the officers and agents of a corporation upon whom service
may be had in the circuit courts, but fails to specify any place of
service. The Supreme Court early felt that it was under the ne-
cessity of seeking elsewhere for some statute fixing the place of
service.2 Section 6 of chapter 41 of the Code provides as follows:
"The service of process, when person or property is not to
be taken into custody, or it is not otherwise specially provided,
30 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comlssion, supra, In which the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the New York court.31 For a collection of cases in point see 7 A. L. R. 1094, an annotation on the
West Virginia case herein discussed.
1 See cases cited In Stout v. B. & 0. R. Co., 64 W. Va. 502, 506, 63 S. E. 817, 131
Am. St. Rep. 940 (1918).
2 It has always been very doubtful to the writer, for reasons that need not be
stated here, whether It was ever intended that chapter 50 of the Code should con-
trol the service of process in the circuit courts.
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shall be subject to the regulations contained in the several'
sections from thirty-two to thirty-nine inclusive of chapter
fifty of this Code."
On the ground that it was not otherwise specially provided for
service of process in the circuit courts upon corporations, it was
held that such service is controlled by sections 34-38 of chapter 50
of the Code. For purposes of this discussion, it will be sufficient
merely to note that section 34 contains the general provisions for
service upon domestic corporations in a justice's court, and sec-
tion 35 contains corresponding provisions for service upon for-
eign corporations.
Prior to Acts of 1903, section 34 read as follows:
"Unless otherwise specially provided such process or order,
and any notice, against a corporation, may be served upon the
president, cashier, treasurer or chief officer thereof, or if there
be no such officer, or if he be absent, on any officer, director,
trustee, or agent of the corporation, at its principal office or
place of business, or in any county in which a director or other
officer, or agent, of said corporation may reside .....
Section 38, which has not been amended nor reenacted since 1881,
provides that service upon an officer or agent of a corporation un-
der the preceding sections "shall be in the county in which he re-
sides; and the return must show this." Hence, prior to Acts of
1903, it was held necessary in all instances that the return show
service in the county in which the officer or agent resided.
By Acts of 1903, immediately after the language quoted above,
the following provision was added to section 34:
"Or and officer or agent of said corporation in the county in
which the property, land or other thing in controversy may be,
or in any county where the cause of action arises."
The effect of -this amendment has been construed in Speidel Gro-
cery Co. v. Warder,' and Stout v. B. & 0. R. Co.,4 in the former
case by way of dictum. As Judge Brannon observed in Speidel
Grocery Co. v. Warder, the statute, since the amendment, is poorly
constructed and indefinite, but it is believed that his interpretation
of it in the latter case, properly understood, with one possible ex-
ception,5 is sound.
s 56 W. Va. 602, 49 S. E 534 (1904).
Cited in note 1, supra.
It is not clear that in section 34 as amended the words "or in any county in
which a director or other officer may reside" must be ignored in all instances; but
this is a question aside from the main discussion.
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The clear purport of the amendment, standing alone, is to the
effect that an officer or agent of a domestic corporation may be
served "in the county in which the property, land or other thing
in controversy may be, or in any county where the cause of action
arises", whether such officer or agent reside therein or not. To this
extent, since the amendment is subsequent in enactment to section
38, it is held to repeal the latter section.8 In a justice's court, the
action must be brought either (1) in the county where the cause
of action arises or (2) in the county where the defendant, or one of
the defendants, resides,7 and process cannot be directed for ser-
vice outside of the county of venue. 8 Hence it would seem that in
all instances in a justice's court where the action is brought against
a domestic corporation in the county where the cause of action
arises, it is no longer necessary for the return to show that the
officer or agent served resides in the county of service.9
But suppose that the basis of venue is the principal office or place
of business of the corporation, in other words, its residence. 10
Clearly, in such instance, the action may be brought in a county
where neither the cause of action arose nor where the "property,
land or other thing in controversy" is, and the officer or agent may,
according to section 34, be served at the principal office or place of
business. In other words, the nature of the service may be such
that it does not come within any of the conditions specified in the
amendment, and the conclusion is that in such instances the old rule
still must govern, and the return must show service in the county
of the officer's or agent's residence. Of course, if the action should
be brought in a county conforming to any of the several condi-
tions mentioned in the amendment, the old rule would not operate,
regardless of the ground or grounds of venue.
Since the amendment which partly repeals section 38 relates only
to section 34, it is easy to reach the conclusion that section 38 still
operates with full force and effect upon section 35 relating to for-
eign corporations. The propriety of this conclusion was indicated
in Stout v. B. & 0. R. Co., and recently was adjudicated in
Leiter v. American-La France Fire Engine Co.," where it is held
that the return of service upon the agent of a foreign corporation
must still in all instances show that the process was served in the
6 See Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder and Stout v. B. & 0. Ri. Co., supra.
7 W. VA. CODE, C. 50, §16.
8 W. VA. CODE, C. 50, §17; Speldel Grocery Co. v. Warder, supra.
o Stout v. B. & o. Co., supra, where the point is actually decided.
16 See Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder, supra.
21 104 S. E. 56 (W. Va. 1920).
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county where the agent resides. As to the point actually decided,
the conclusion of the court is logical and correct; but the opinion
goes further and, by way of dictum, asserts, in effect, that section
S8, insofar as it relates to section 34, is entirely repealed, thus mak-
ing necessary the conclusion that in no instance where an officer or
.agent of a domestic corporation is served is it necessary for the re-
turn to show that he was served in the county of his residence.
It is submitted that the dictum in the latter case is too broad.
The writer does not have sufficient courage to undertake even a
suggestion of the possibilities reposing in the statutory medley in-
volved; but it is believed that the statute has been subjected to suffi-
cient analysis in the previous paragraphs to show that section 38
.still operates to some extent upon section 34, relating to domestic
-corporations. Moreover, previous decisions of the Supreme Court
indicate the same conclusion. It is true that the syllabus in
.Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder may be cited in support of the dic-
tum in the recent case, but only a glance at this syllabus is neces-
.sary to disclose that it is ambiguous. Properly understood, the
phrase "whether the person served resides therein or not, and the
return of service need not show that he resides therein" is intended
to refer exclusively to those instances wherein the action is
'brought in the county where the cause of action arises. The course
of reasoning throughout the opinion in Speidel Grocery Co. v. War-
-der makes this clear, and so does Judge Brannon's express language.
He expressly decides nothing except that the return need not show
that the officer or agent was served in the county where he resides
-when the action is brought in the county where the cause of action
arises. He expressly declines to decide anything as to the necessi-
ties of the return when the action is brought in the county where
the corporation has its principal office or place of business and
where the cause of action did not arise. At the bottom of page 608
-of the opinion, he says, "I will not say whether it has repealed the
necessity of showing in the return the residence where the action
is in the county of the office."
In Stout v. B. & 0. R. Co., the only other case except Leiter
v. American-La France Fire Engine Co., in which the question is
discussed, the opinion does not say so, but evidently the action was
'brought in the county where the cause of action arose. So far as the
actual adjudication extends, Stout v. B. & 0. R. Co. does not go
any farther than the dictum in Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder is
4
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quoted, but Judge Miller beyond a doubt gave to it the interpreta-
tion hereinbefore stated as the correct one. He says:
"This construction may not necessarily work a repeal of see-
tion 38. It may perhaps still be applied with its full force to
the other provisions of section 34; but this question is not pre-
sented and we do not decide it."
Perhaps the dictum in Leiter v. American-La France Fire Engine-
Co. either is inadvertent or else was based, without full considera-
tion, upon the ambiguous syllabus of Speidel Grocery Co. v. War-
der. -L. C.
FORFEITURE OF OIL AND GAS LEASE FOp BREACH OF COVENANT.-
The Supreme Court of Kansas recently has affirmed a judgment
canceling an oil and gas lease for breach of an express covenant to
complete a well on the premises within sixty days.' The lease in
question was for a term of one year and as long thereafter as oil
or gas should be produced or operations continued. The lessees
covenanted "to complete a well on satd premises within sixty (60)
days from the date hereof, or in case of a failure to complete a
well Within the time above specified, to pay to the first parties
fifteen dollars ($15) in advance for each additional month such
completion is unavoidably delayed from the time above men-
tioned for the completion of such well, until the well is completed
or this contract is surrendered, as is hereinafter provided; . . ."
The lessees did not begin a well within sixty days from the date of
the lease. Two days after the expiration of the sixty day period
the lessor served notice on the lessees that the lease was forfeited
for failure of the lessees to perform the covenants and conditions.
therein. Suit was then started to cancel the lease. The trial
court found that the lessees had made no effort to develop the
premises within sixty days, and that this failure to do so was not
the result of unavoidable delays. The court held that the proper
construction of the covenant was that the lessees were bound to
complete a well within sixty days, except that its completion might
be deferred in case there was unavoidable delay, and that by rea-
son of the omission and neglect of the defendants to keep and
perform this covenant they had forfeited their rights. Judgment
was entered canceling and setting aside the lease. The Supreme
Court affirmed this judgment on the sole ground that the defend-
' Waters v. Hatfield, 190 Pae. 599 (Kan. 1920).
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